Chief Justice Traynor and Criminal Law by Hall, Jerome
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 35 | Issue 5 Article 4
1-1984
Chief Justice Traynor and Criminal Law
Jerome Hall
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jerome Hall, Chief Justice Traynor and Criminal Law, 35 Hastings L.J. 817 (1984).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol35/iss5/4
Chief Justice Traynor and Criminal
Law
By JEROME HALL*
One key to understanding Chief Justice Traynor's judicial emi-
nence is that he was a scholar on the bench. But other judges have
been or are scholars; indeed, some have had distinguished academic
careers. What are the qualities that distinguished Chief Justice Tray-
nor's opinions and gave him a national, indeed, an international, repu-
tation? I will answer this question by examining the method and
substance of Chief Justice Traynor's opinions in several areas of crimi-
nal law.
False Pretenses
In 1954 Chief Justice Traynor wrote the majority opinion in Peo-
ple v. Ashley, a pathbreaking decision. Ashley was charged with hav-
ing defrauded two elderly women. Although some of Ashley's
misrepresentations were ordinary misrepresentations of existing facts,
the principal issue concerned the defendant's promises that he would
build a theater, give the women a first mortgage, and pay six percent
interest-all of which he failed to do.2 This case raised the novel ques-
tion of whether a promise to do something in the future made with an
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1. 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954).
2. Id at 253, 267 P.2d at 276.
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intention not to do what was promised could be a misrepresentation of
fact. Traynor, rejecting the majority rule, answered affirmatively.
The cornerstone of Chief Justice Traynor's method was thorough
scholarship. In Ashley he first stated the facts of the case in detail, in-
cluding the fact that at one point, when one of the women complained,
the defendant drew a revolver from his drawer and threatened her.
The Chief Justice then noted: "The jury could reasonably conclude that
defendant . . . deliberately set out to acquire the life savings of his
victims, one a woman nearing 70 and the other a woman of little edu-
cation and rural background and both with little or no business
experience."'3
Turning to the legal analysis, Traynor first disposed of a prelimi-
nary issue. He distinguished larceny by trick from larceny by false pre-
tenses, holding that the latter was committed because the woman
intended to pass title to the money as well as possession.4
The Chief Justice then addressed the principal issue of misrepre-
sentation. He began by using the historical method, noting first that
"[t]he crime of obtaining money by false pretenses was unknown in the
early common law." 5 He cited an English case, Rex v. Goodhall,6 in
which the judge set aside the conviction "because the pretense 'was
merely a promise of future conduct.' "-7 Traynor found three problems
with Goodhall. First, the decision was questionable even when it was
decided, given an earlier English decision that was not cited in Good-
hal. Second, the Goodhall decision confused larceny by false pretenses
with the crime of "cheat." Finally, he contended that Goodhall was
"contrary to the plain meaning of the statute"8 under which it was de-
cided,9 and he referred to two English writers in support of his
interpretation. '0
The Chief Justice then turned to American case law, focusing on
the leading Massachusetts case of Commonwealth P. Drew." He con-
cluded that in Drew the court had completely misinterpreted Goodhall
and had used dicta from other questionable decisions to uphold a false
3. Id at 267, 267 P.2d at 284. Traynor was born and grew up in a small town in Utah.
4. Id. at 258, 267 P.2d at 279.
5. Id at 259, 267 P.2d at 279.
6. Rex v. Goodhall, Russ. & Ry. 461, 168 Eng. Rep. 898 (1821).
7. Id at 463, 168 Eng. Rep. at 899.
8. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d at 260, 267 P.2d at 280.
9. 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24, § 1 (1757).
10. J. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 183 (3d ed. 1828); H.
ROSCOE, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 418 (2d Amer. ed. 1840).
11. 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 179 (1837).
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pretenses conviction.12 The Drew case had wide influence because
Wharton, in his criminal law treatise, had formulated a misleading but
influential rule based on the case. 13 Traynor cited cases in several
states where, by legislation or judicial decision, the old Wharton rule
had been rejected. The precedents in California were conflicting. Al-
though earlier decisions followed Wharton, in recent cases convictions
for fraud had been based on promises made with the intention not to
perform. According to Traynor, these decisions, like those following
the majority rule, "were made with little explanation of the reason for
the rule."' 14
Justice Schauer strongly opposed Traynor's position on this issue,
writing a vigorous dissent in protest of the majority's "revolutionary
holding."'15 Justice Schauer opposed a conviction that he thought was
based only on the mental state of the defendant. He contended that the
majority rule created a danger for honest businessmen who simply
failed to pay their creditors. 16 He supported this contention by con-
trasting the majority's concept of fraud based solely on the subjective
state of the defendant's mind with other crimes, e.g., burglary, where
there were objective facts, such as entry, to support a finding of mens
rea. According to Justice Schauer, the new rule in Ashley could be ap-
plied to debtors who had engaged in a series of perfectly legal transac-
tions. Finally, he argued that there was no need for a new rule because
there were misrepresentations of existing facts upon which to base the
defendant's conviction.
Chief Justice Traynor did not find such reasoning persuasive. In-
stead of attacking Justice Schauer's dissenting opinion directly, Justice
Traynor refuted his argument by analyzing a decision of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals' 7 that made the same points urged in the
Schauer dissent.' 8 First, Traynor noted, in many American states, in-
cluding California, as well as in England, false promises could be the
ground of a civil action for deceit. 19 Second, more than non-perform-
ance is required to prove the mens rea necessary for conviction. A busi-
nessman's mere failure to pay a debt is not sufficient to satisfy this
requirement. Moreover, in a criminal case, proof of guilt must be be-
12. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d at 260, 267 P.2d at 280.
13. F. WHARTON, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 542 (1st ed. 1846).
14. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d at 262, 267 P.2d at 281 (1954).
15. Id. at 274, 267 P.2d at 288.
16. Id. at 276-77, 267 P.2d at 290.
17. Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
18. Id. at 698-99.
19. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d at 263, 267 P.2d at 282.
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yond a reasonable doubt. Finally, a specific intent must be proved in
many crimes; the prosecution in a case of fraud must prove that the
misrepresentation was made "knowingly and with intent to deceive."20
He concluded that "the inclusion of false promises in [the crime of false
pretenses] will not 'materially encumber' business affairs." 21 In support
he cited an article reporting relevant inquiries to Better Business Bu-
reaus in leading cities and their answers to the effect that no cases were
known of convictions for "ordinary commercial default."2 2 He then
announced the policy that he advocated: "If false promises were not
false pretenses, the legally sophisticated without fear of punishment,
could perpetrate on the unwary fraudulent schemes .... -23 This de-
cision, among others,24 demonstrates Justice Traynor's objectivity and
rebuts the notion that in criminal cases he was always on the side of the
defendant.
Justice Traynor was a master of the art of legal innovation. While
he espoused the idea that judges have a creative function,25 his trail-
blazing opinions were the product of painstaking analysis. His innova-
tions were miles apart from those of judges (some of the United States
Supreme Court) who simply imposed their ideology on their decision-
making. Aside from the fairness of the Ashley decision, what distin-
guishes his opinions from those of others is the thoroughness of his
probing and the rationality of his analysis. History, precedent, the rea-
sons present or lacking in the earlier decisions, the underlying policies,
counsel's arguments regarding the relevant statutes, and the trial-all
20. Id. at 264, 267 P.2d at 282.
21. Id. at 265, 267 P.2d at 283.
22. Id at 265 n.6, 267 P.2d at 283 n.6.
23. id at 265, 267 P.2d at 283. Finally, Chief Justice Traynor discussed defendant's
contentions regarding corroboration, sufficiency of the evidence, new evidence, and denial
of motions by the trial court. Id. at 267-74, 267 P.2d at 285-88. The order denying the
motion for a new trial was affirmed. Id at 274, 267 P.2d at 288.
24. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. 2d 470, 261 P.2d 1 (1953). See also infra note
62 & accompanying text.
25. Justice Traynor nevertheless believed that the creative function of the judiciary was
narrow in scope. He wrote that "a judge undertakes only piecework on request, and never
works free of precautions. Even when he is called upon to put a statute under his magnify-
ing glass, he stays close to his bases of the common law. He invariably looks for precedent
as his starting point. He is constrained to arrive at a judgment in the context of ancestral
judicial experience: the given judgments; or lacking these, the given dicta; or lacking these,
the given clues. Even if his search of the past yields nothing, so that he confronts a truly
unprecedented case, he still arrives at a judgment in the context of judicial reasoning with
recognizable ties to the past. By that kinship, a judgment not only establishes the unprece-
dented case as a precedent for the future, but integrates it into the often rewoven but always
durable network of common law." Traynor, Transatlanic Reflections on the Limits of Judi-
cial Creativity, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 255, 262.
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received carefully reasoned study. Chief Justice Traynor was as objec-
tive as it was possible to be in dealing with a socio-legal problem.
Felony Murder
A second area of substantive criminal law in which Chief Justice
Traynor made an important contribution is that of felony-murder. In
the 1965 case of People v. Washington,26 the defendant had been
charged with the murder of his accomplice in a robbery. During an
attempted robbery of a gas station, one of the robbers pointed a re-
volver at the owner, who immediately shot and killed him. The owner
then went to the door, saw the accomplice Washington running away,
and shot and wounded him. 27 Washington appealed from the convic-
tion of robbery and first degree felony-murder.
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Traynor discussed the fact
that the felony-murder rule had been abolished in England in 1957.
He cited the criticism of the felony-murder rule by several scholars and
pointed out that in Michigan,28 Pennsylvania,29 and New York30 the
felony-murder rule had been restricted to killing by the felon, thereby
excluding killings by an intended victim or a policeman. He plainly
agreed with the criticism that the traditional felony-murder rule "er-
odes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability. '31
He forcefully argued that the killing in Washington was not in further-
ance of the felony but was in resistance to the felony. 32 Washington's
robbery conviction was upheld, but the murder conviction was
reversed.
Chief Justice Traynor seems to have agreed with earlier cases
which held that when the felon directly kills, he is liable for first degree
murder under the felony murder rule even if he killed accidently.33
Despite his reluctance to extend the felony-murder rule to include kill-
ing by the intended victim or a policeman,34 he acknowledged that "de-
fendants who initiate gun battles may also be found guilty of murder if
26. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
27. Id. at 779, 402 P.2d at 132, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
28. People v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963).
29. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
30. People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960).
31. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 783, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
32. Id at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
33. Id
34. "To invoke the felony-murder doctrine when the killing is not committed by the
defendant or by his accomplice could lead to absurd results." Id at 782, 402 P.2d at 134, 44
Cal. Rptr. at 446.
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their victims resist and kill."35
Traynor believed, however, that if someone other than the felon
fires the lethal shot in a gun battle initiated by the felon, it must first be
proved that, in addition to the mens rea for the felony, the defendant
had the mens rea for second-degree murder. Only then may the felony-
murder rule be applied, and its effect is to increase the gravity of the
offense to first-degree murder. This conclusion about Traynor's view
can be reached by juxtaposing statements he made in two other opin-
ions. In the earlier case of People v. Thomas,36 Traynor had written
that Penal Code section 189, which contains the felony-murder provi-
sion,37 "does not state that a 'killing' perpetrated. . . is murder of the
first degree. It speaks only of 'murder' that is so perpetrated. '3 8 In the
post- Washington case of People v. Gilbert,39 another felony-murder
case, he said, "[wihen murder is established under Penal Code sections
187 and 188. . . section 189 [the felony murder provision] may prop-
erly be invoked to determine the degree of that murder."4
Traynor's qualified acceptance of the felony-murder rule where
the felon does not directly kill was subordinate to his approval in
Washington of the Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New York decisions
limiting application of the felony-murder rule to direct killing by the
felon and to his emphasis on the requirement that the killing be in fur-
therance of the felony.41
35. Id. Justice Burke, joined by Justice McComb, dissented on the ground that point-
ing a gun at the owner of the gas station was initiating a gun battle. Id. at 785, 402 P.2d at
136, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 448 (Burke, J., dissenting).
36. 41 Cal. 2d 470, 261 P.2d 1 (1953).
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984).
38. Thomas, 41 Cal. 2d at 477, 261 P.2d at 5 (Traynor, J., concurring).
39. 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1966). In Gilbert, Chief Justice
Traynor, writing the majority opinion, reversed the conviction for several reasons, among
them the fact that the trial judge instructed the jury in terms of proximate cause. The Chief
Justice stated that "ItIhis instruction withdrew from the jury the crucial issue of whether the
shooting of Weaver was in response to the shooting of Davis [his accomplice] or solely to
prevent the robbery." Id. at 704, 408 P.2d at 373, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
40. Id at 705, 408 P.2d at 374, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
41. In Washington, Chief Justice Traynor, drawing on relevant Pennsylvania cases, had
written: "It is not enough that the killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen and that the
robbery might therefore be regarded as a proximate cause of the killing." 62 Cal. 2d at 781,
402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445. If the California Penal Code is revised and a felony-
murder rule is retained, Justice Traynor's decisions, the Model Penal Code, and conflicting
laws in Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania will make it necessary to address certain




Diminished capacity is another major area of criminal law that
Chief Justice Traynor addressed, principally in People v. Conley.42 The
defendant had been convicted for killing a husband and wife while he
was grossly intoxicated. The trial judge did not instruct the jury that
diminished capacity could negate malice and thereby reduce the crime
to manslaughter. The California Supreme Court, in an opinion written
by Chief Justice Traynor, reversed the conviction and held that "evi-
dence of diminished capacity, whether caused by intoxication, trauma
or disease, can be used to show that a defendant did not have a specific
mental state essential to an offense."4 3 The court further held that "[a]
person who intentionally kills may be incapable of harboring malice
aforethought because of a mental disease, defect, or intoxication."' 4
Traynor's rationale in support of the diminished capacity rule con-
trasts sharply with current uncertainties emanating from Proposition 8
and Penal Code section 28. Penal Code section 25(a),45 adopted pursu-
ant to Proposition 8, abolished the defense of diminished capacity, but
Penal Code section 25(c),46 also part of Proposition 8, allows evidence
of diminished capacity to be considered in the sentencing or other dis-
position of a case. Penal Code section 28(a) renders evidence of mental
disease, defect, or disorder inadmissible to negate the capacity to form a
specific intent and states that such evidence is admissible "solely on the
issue whether or not the accused actualoyformed a required specific in-
tent." 47 This treatment is tenable although debatable regarding mental
disease or defect short of insanity, and perhaps regarding trauma, but it
is highly questionable regarding intoxication. Since 1838 in England,48
and somewhat later in this country,4 9 gross intoxication has been used
to disprove an alleged mens rea and thereby to reduce a criminal homi-
cide to manslaughter in states where murder is not divided into de-
grees. In states where such a division is made, murder in the first
degree is reduced to second-degree murder or to manslaughter. In the
42. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 42 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
43. Id. at 316, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 818. In crimes that do not include a
lesser offense, the result is acquittal. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678 (1866) (voting
twice); People v. Blake, 65 Cal. 275, 4 P. 1 (1884) (forgery).
44. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d at 318, 411 P.2d at 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (West Supp. 1984).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(c) (West Supp. 1984).
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (West Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
48. Regina v. Cruse, 9 Car. & P. 541, 546, 173 Eng. Rep. 610, 612 (1838).
49. See, e.g., Booker v. State, 156 Ind. 435, 60 N.E. 156 (1900); Keeton v. Common-
wealth, 92 Ky. 522, 18 S.W. 359 (1892).
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original English and early American opinions, the term "diminished
capacity" was not used, but identical results were reached. Thus, to
exclude evidence of gross intoxication from the trial of the issues would
be an extreme, if not revolutionary, innovation.50
Without going into the complexities that the current law entails,:5
it can only be noted here that the major, indeed probably the sole, pur-
pose of the traditional law in this country and in England allowing
evidence of incapacity to be introduced was to determine whether the
defendant had the required mens rea.5 2 In many cases, reliance only on
external facts cannot prove a required mens rea. For example, even if a
person draws a gun and says, "I am going to kill you," and then follows
through on his threat, he may not be guilty of first-degree murder. He
may have been mistaken regarding relevant facts because of fear, emo-
tional distress, brain damage, or gross intoxication and therefore may
not have had the requisite mens rea. Except where the defendant's
adult normality is assumed or admitted, it is hard to visualize a situa-
tion in which the required mens rea could be established without rely-
ing on evidence of the defendant's mental capacity. The admissibility
of evidence of irrational acts must proceed from the premise that mens
rea depends on mental capacity and the corollary that incapacity ne-
gates certain mental states required as elements of crimes.
Plainly, Proposition 8 and Penal Code section 28 were reactions to
public clamor that might more rationally have been directed not
against the law but against the juries who returned questionable ver-
dicts. However, there is no escaping the principle behind Chief Justice
Traynor's opinion in Conley, that in criminal law the moral culpability
of the defendant is of basic importance. Hence, to find a grossly intoxi-
cated person guilty of murder in the first degree challenges the deeply
rooted principle of moral culpability.53 Moreover, it is wishful thinking
50. In State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 1982), the court refused to admit
evidence of diminished capacity relevant to mental disease short of insanity. But the court
reaffirmed its adherence to the traditional rule that evidence of intoxication may be intro-
duced in the trial of the issues for the purpose of reducing the gravity of the crime charged.
In California diminished capacity meant mental disease, trauma, or intoxication.
Hence, the indiscriminate rejection of diminished capacity rejects evidence of intoxication in
the trial of the principal issue.
5 1. Because of the centuries-old treatment of intoxication as a ground for lowering a
charge of murder to manslaughter, and because intoxication was included in "diminished
capacity" in California, there may be constitutional questions regarding the complete elimi-
nation of diminished capacity.
52. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 107, 534, 537 (2d ed. 1960).
53. The importance of moral culpability in criminal law can be seen in the reaction of
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association to the demand for a "guilty but
insane" verdict, generated by the public outcry in response to the Hindey decision. Insanity
[Vol. 35
to imagine that this value is as well preserved by substituting a court's
discretion in sentencing for prescription in law.
Other Contributions to Criminal Law
Chief Justice Traynor made other important contributions to crim-
inal law. In Perez v. Sharp5 4 he wrote the opinion that held the anti-
miscegenation statute unconstitutional, anticipating the same ruling by
the United States Supreme Court by sixteen years. 5 Additionally, in
People v. Hood56 he provided a much needed clarification of the dis-
tinction between "specific intent" and "general intent. '57
Justice Traynor also made important contributions in the area of
criminal procedure. In 1955, in People v. Cahan,58 he wrote the opinion
that adopted the exclusionary rule, not only reversing years of Califor-
nia precedent,59 but also reversing his earlier position.60 He expanded
the criminal defendant's discovery rights in People v. Riser 61 and up-
held the prosecution's right to discovery against criminal defendants in
Jones v. Superior Court.62 In People v. Ibarra,63 although the defendant
had the assistance of appointed counsel, Justice Traynor held that
counsel's failure to investigate all defenses denied the defendant a fair
trial.64 Dissenting in People v. Brown,65 Justice Traynor urged an ex-
pansion of the indigent's right to counsel, arguing that the right should
Test, 69 A.B.A.J. 426 (April 1983). The delegates recommended only the exclusion of the
"irresistible impulse" defense as formulated by the Model Penal Code. Id The delegates
further recommended that in states allowing the irresistible impulse test, the burden of proof
should be on the defendant. Id. Thus, the final American Bar Association recommendation
regarding insanity closely approximated California law prior to People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d
333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978). For the writer's criticism of the irresistible
impulse rule and its refined statement in the Model Penal Code, see J. HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMrNAL LAW 486-504 (2d ed. 1960)). Unfortunately, Drew adopted the
"irresistible impulse" test. Those who drafted Proposition 8 and Penal Code section 28 are
to be commended both for their decision to leave insanity within the trial of the issues and
also for their rejection of the "irresistible impulse" test.
54. 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
55. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
56. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
57. Id. at 456-58, 462 P.2d at 377-79, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 625-27.
58. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
59. Paulsen, Criminal Law Administration" The Zero Hour Was Coming, 53 CALIF. L.
REv. 103, 104 (1965).
60. See People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942) (holding that states are
not bound by the fourth amendment's prohibition of the use of illegally acquired evidence in
criminal trials).
61. 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
62. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
63. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
64. Id. at 464-65, 386 P.2d at 491, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
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extend to appeals of right by indigents convicted of felonies. Though
not adopted by a majority of the California Supreme Court in Brown,66
Justice Traynor's views were later approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Douglas v. Cal'fornia.67
Tribute to Justice Roger Traynor
Justice Traynor's opinions and his reputation as one of the na-
tion's greatest judges have elicited many expressions of appreciation. A
small sample of the huge volume of praise is indicative of the esteem in
which he was held. Erwin Griswold, former dean of the Harvard Law
School, writing in 1965 about the great judges of the past, mentioned
Mansfield in England; Sharswood, Ruffin, Cardozo, and Vanderbilt in
the United States; and among the then-living judges, he included only
Schaefer, Traynor, and Lord Denning.68 More recently, Professor Ber-
nard Schwartz of the New York University Law School included Tray-
nor in his list of the ten greatest American judges, along with Marshall,
Holmes, Cardozo, and other celebrated judges.69
Justice Schaefer wrote that Traynor "has been for many years our
number one judge. ' 70 Professor Schwartz wrote that "Traynor's own
contributions... can be compared only to those made by earlier mas-
ters of the judicial craft, such as Shaw or Cardozo. ' 71 "Traynor's opin-
ions display perhaps a greater mastery of the judicial art than those of
any state judge since Cardozo.' 72 The late Professor Harry Kalven, a
leading authority on tort law, had high praise for Traynor's opinions in
that field,73 and Professor Currie, a conflict of laws scholar, said that
Traynor's opinion in Bernhard v. Bank of America74 was "a classic of
jurisprudence, an early attainment of his lifetime goal of substituting
reason for unreason in the law."75
65. 55 Cal. 2d 64, 69, 357 P.2d 1072, 1075, 9 Cal. Rptr. 816, 819 (1960) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
66. See id. at 65-69, 357 P.2d at 1072-75, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 816-819.
67. 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1962).
68. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017, 1018 (1965).
69. Schwartz, The Judicial Ten: American's Greatest Judges, 1979 So. ILL. U.L.J. 405,
407.
70. Schaefer, Chief Justice Traynor and the Judicial Process, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 11, 24
(1965).
71. Schwartz, supra note 67, at 440.
72. Schwartz, supra note 67, at 441.
73. Kalven, Torts: The Questfor Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 189 (1965).
74. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
75. Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 26 (1965). See
also G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADMON 292-316 (1976).
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Justice Traynor became a member of the Hastings Faculty in 1970,
when I also came to Hastings. He taught criminal procedure and a
seminar in judicial process; I taught substantive criminal law and juris-
prudence. In 1973 Dean Anderson appointed a Criminal Law Survey
Committee consisting of Justice Traynor, Professor Perkins, and my-
self, as the senior members, and four of the younger faculty members.
The committee met once each week for five months, circulated a ques-
tionnaire among the students, and drafted a twenty-two page report.
Traynor attended all of these meetings and made many helpful sugges-
tions which received unanimous approval.
Before joining the Hastings faculty, I had, of course, read some of
Justice Traynor's opinions, but my position on the Hastings faculty
made it necessary to familiarize myself with California criminal law. I
read many more of Traynor's decisions in the criminal law field and
discovered that they were invariably of a high scholarly order. I
learned that he had a Ph.D. in political science as well as the degree in
law. He was, in short, a scholar on the bench with an educational
background not equaled by many judges. When I told some of my
colleagues my assessment of Traynor's opinions in criminal law, Larry
Eldredge, who had succeeded Prosser in torts, said he found the same
high level of decision in Traynor's opinions in tort cases; teachers of
other fields of law joined in the chorus of praise.
Finally, if an old colleague of Justice Traynor may be allowed to
add a personal note in which the entire Hastings faculty would cer-
tainly join, it is this: Roger Traynor was one of Nature's gentlemen. In
his relations with students and colleagues, he was invariably kind,
friendly, and warm. He lives in the hearts of those who were privileged
to work with him.
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